Introduction
So-called donkey -sentences like the one in (I) raise many important issues for the syntax and semantics of natural language quantification. (I) If a farmer owns a donkey. he often beats it.
The most influential account of donkey sentences was pioneered by David Lewis ( I 975), Hans Kamp ( l 981 ) . and Irene Heim ( I 982 ) . Its main ingredients are: (i) Indefinites are not existential quantifiers as traditional logic maintained; instead they are interpreted as restricted free variables. (ii) These variables can be bound by an "adverb of quantification" (Lewis' term) . such as (iften in (I); these adverbs are unselective binders which can bind all free variables in their scope. (iii) The donkey pronouns are also bound by this unselective binder. (iv) if-clauses in general serve to supply the domain of such unselective quantifiers.
Our example donkey-sentence (I) will then receive the logical form and the paraphrase in (2).
(2) a. Oftenx.y la farmertx) "a donkey (y)" x owns yl Ix beats yl b. ''Many pairs x,y such that xis a farmer, y is a donkey, and x owns y are such that x beats y".
The literature on adverbial quantification is plentiful and the Lewis-KampHeim account is by no means the last word. The architect of a theory of adverbial quantification has many important decisions to make. Very roughly and recklessly put, at each choice point the theory could go towards more syntax or more semantics/pragmatics. Let me sketch four issues that have been focal points of the theoretical debates. (i) What kind of things are quantified over? Following Lewis ( 1975) , many researchers assume that adverbial quantifiers quantify over tuples of restricted variables. The alternative, initially more intuitive, is to assume quantification over something like situations (events, times. states of affairs, circumstances, conditions. whatever). (ii) What is the nature of indefinite noun phrases? In the Lewis-Kamp-Heim approach they serve to introduce and restrict *The ti tic chosen here differs from the much less appropriate title or 1he abstracl submitted to SALT II ("Conditional Reslrictnrs and (Un)Selective Bindinf'). This paper is a preliminary report on ongoing research which 1s sUpJX>scd to culminate in a significanl parl of my dissertation. Some or this material was prcscn1ed in an earlier form at ween. XI (Hm Fintcl 199:?) . A much belier paper would have resulted if I had had more time to take into account the arguments and prnJX,sals of Manfred Krifka 's SALT II paper ( Krifka 199'.!) . which cm-crs some of the same ground a~ mine. While engaged in this research. l ha,c enjoyed the inestimable help of Barbani Partee, Angelika Kratzer, V eena DwiYc<li, lfotJ.c Rullmann, P.,rnl Portner, an<l Sue Tunstall. All mistakes arc mine. free variables. A situation-based approach may be compatible with the more conservative view that they are existential quantifiers. (iii) What is the nature of donkey pronouns? In the Lewis-Kamp-Heim approach they arc bound variable pronouns dependent on the unselective quantifier. A situntion-based approach would have to tnke recourse to the E-type account which treats donkey pronouns as disguised definite descriptions. (iv) How is the domain ol the ad\erbial quantifier determined? This question doesn't really arise with nominal quantifiers whose common noun directly gives the appropriate domain. With adverbial quantifiers we have what. following Diesing ( 1990) and Krifka ( I 992) . could be called the problem of "semantic partition". There is more to be said here than the usual assumption that i(clauses are designated devices for restricting quantifiers. Things arc more complicated: material from the matrix clause can be quantified over. and not all the material in an if-clause has to be quantified over (this is known as the "'proportion problem"). Researchers have attcmpti:d to get at the roots of semantic partition from different nnglc~. There arc syntax-based proposals, especially the theory of Molly Diesing ( l 990) and Angelika Kratzer ( l 989a). There are pragmatics based proposals: for ei\ample, Herman ( 1987) seems to go in this direction. And there are focus,based proposals (Rooth 1985 . 1989 , Krifka 1992 , von Fintel 1992a .
At this point. we need new considerations and new data to evaluate the performance of the various theories. What kind of new data might there be'? Henriette de Swart ( 1992) and Cleo Condoravdi ( 1992) both discuss types or uses of noun phrases that had not been considered before in the donkey literature. The avenue that I am exploring in current research is to investigate other adverbial clause-types beyond the usual if/when-clauses and their interaction with quantification. I In this paper, I will present and analyte data conreming the availability of donl,.ey-anaphora with indcfinit.es in complex conditionals (11n/e11, <mfr if.. C\'Cfl if) . Throughout. l will hold certain assumptions constnnt which ! lay out in Section I. Roughly, I adopt Heim's ( 1990) ··scmanticky"' situntion-based appronch to adverbial quantification t.hat treats indefinites as existential quantifiers and take, donkey pronouns to bt· r:-l) pc pronouns. Within this framework. I briefly propose a semantics for cornpkx conditionals (Scl"lion 2), and skeld1 :rn account of why indefinites in complex conditionals arc generally not availahk for donkey anaphora (Sectiun 3). In the central part of the paper. I then investigate the respective roles ol focus and syntactic scoping in the derivation of the domain of adverbial quantifiers. In Section 4, I show how focus can make indefinites in complex conditionals available for donkey-anaphora after all And finally in Section 5, I explore the respective bragging rights ol focus and syntactic scoping. Berman ( 1987) and Heim ( 1990) who suggest that adverbs of quantification quantif) 01 er situations. They adopt the framework of situation sc!llantics developed by Angelika Kratzer ( 1989b) lo handle problems of counlerfactual reasoning.' There situations arc parts of possible worlds and propusiti,rns arc reconstructed as \l'ts of situations (intuiti\cly. thusi: situations in which the proposition is true). Modulo the interpretation of the pronouns and some rl'fincmcnts, this gives ( 1 ) the logiral form in (3 ).
(3) a. Oftens Is a farmer 0\1;ns a donkey! Is he beats 1tl h. '"Man) situations in which there is a fanucr ,rnd there is a donkey that the farmer owns are such that he beats ii."
Whal can w,, do with th,· pronouns in the matrix clause? The situation-based approach takes f\'Coursc lo the theory of pronouns as disguised definite descriptions (Cooper l 979. El'ans l 980). Let me be non committal as to any specific implementation of the E type approach (for some discussion of the choices sec Heim 1990 . Neale 1990 . and Chierchia 1991 . The logical form for ( l J is then amended to (4).
(4) a. Oflens Is a farmer owns a donkey l ls the farmi:r b~·ats the donkey I b. "Many sirnations in which thl'fe is a farmer and there is a donkey that the farmer owns are <;uch that the farma brats th,, donk<·y ...
One laq r11udif1,·ati(>n h,1s to be made. In her dissert;1tion, Heim had argll<'d Ycry forceful I) agai n,t the I·: ty pc eunqrnal of donkey pn>nuuns using among uthcrs her now famous sage plant example, a cunditional \ersion uf which i, given in (.'iJ.
(5)
If someone buys a sage plan! here he usually buys l'ight others with it.
The probkrn uf cnurse is that there won·t be a u11iq11<~ sage plant that the dcfinill' desniptiun hid\kn in the I· type pronuun c,m fclicituusly rdcr tu. The sit11ation based acn1unt has an answn to this prohlt·111. Ht·rn1,rn ( 1987) First, I will assume that adverbs of quantification denolc relations bc1wecn sets of situations. That is. adverbs of quantification can be treated as quantifo:rs in the tradition of generalized quantifier theory (for detailed discussion the reader is referred to Schwarzschild 1988 , and de Swart 1991 . For example, alwun will denote the subset relation (modified to allow for Berman's minimality trickl.
The first argument of the quantifier is special. Adopting. a suggestion by Mats Rooth ( 1985 Rooth ( , 1989 Rooth ( . 1991 . I assume that the first argument of an adverb of quantification is a free variable C lhat can be restricted in various ways: explicit!} by an ifdausc, or implicitly by an:ommodating presupposed material.4
The second argument of the adverbial quantifier is supplied by the matrix clause minus the adverb. The general schema for the interpretation of adverbial!) quantified sentences with a restrictive if-clause is given in (7). Example (I) is now analyzed as in (8).5 4 Assum1ng C to be a ,anablc '"er sets of situations 1,; a s1mphfii:atton. Angelika Kratzer ( J<17X) has sho\\ n that the first argument. the com crsational background ,n her !crmm,,logy, is actual!, ol a highc1 I~ pc. Non-tri\ ial issue, arc at stake here ,rnJ this is one of lhc most pressing needs 1,,, further d,1boration. 5 Annthcr i,suc that l skirt here concerns the question of compnsitionalit} of the treatment m ( 11 ). Ohv1ously, the conditional opertaor here magically operates inside the internal structure of 1hc c,pression 1! combine_, 11·1th syntactically.
(8) a. lif(3x 3y (fanner(x) owns donkey(y))I, many !Cl !the farmer beats the donkey!.
b. ""Many of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations in which there is a farmer and there is a donkey and the farmer owns the donkey are part of a larger situation in which the farmer beats the donkey." (9a) is paraphrased by (9b).
The Semantics of Complex Conditionals
(9) a. I will leave unless Bill calls soon. b. I will leave ifBill doesn ·1 call soon.
Taken together with the semantics for if as marking a restrictive operator on the domain of an adverbial quantifier. this would suggest that unles.1 is a subtractive or exceptive operator on quantifiers. Something along the lines of ( 10) seems called for. The example in (9a) then gets a paraphrase as in ( l l) ( IOJ unless K Q ICI !Ml::: Q JC -RI !Ml ( 11) ''All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations except the ones in which Bill calls soon are part of a larger situation in which I leave." (modulo modality and tense)
In von Fintel ( 1991) I discussed in some detail the advantages of this approach to the meaning of unless. which can be traced back to Geis ( 1973) , I argued there not only that unle.H is a subtractive operator on quantifier domains, but also that there is an additional implicature: the unless-clause states the only exception to the quantified proposition. The except-paraphrase employed in ( 11) almost captures that ingredient. As far as I can see, this uniqueness implicature does not interact with donkey-anaphora, which is why I will ignore this complication here.
Focus Adverbs + If
The guiding principle in our dealings with <mfr if and even ifconditionals will be that in them the foeus adverbs only and even have the same meaning that they have in cases where they are attached to non-conditional statements. That is we should be able to take a semantics for the focus adverbs onlv and even and combine it with a semantics for if-clauses and get as a result a satisfactury analysis of on~v ifand even if-conditionals. 6
As far as the semantics of focus is concerned, I will stay fairly informal at this point and trust that my suggestions here can he spclkd out in more detail in either Rooth"s ( 1985 Rooth"s ( . 1989 Rooth"s ( . 1991 altcrnatiH~ sema11tics or the slructurcd propositions approach of Krifka ( 1991 Krifka ( , 1992 and others. All we need to assume for now is that focussing evokes a set of relevant contrasts to the focussed item. There arc relevant contrasts to individuals. to properties, to propositions, etc. The sentence JOHN stole 1he hook evokes a set of relevant contrasts to John, presumably other possible culprits, The sentence John SWI,\1S evokes a set of relevant contrasts to swimming, perhaps other e.xcf<"isc acti\· ities. The sentence
The Sll,'l'"S shining might evoke a set of relevant co11trasts to the proposit.ion that the sun is shining, perhaps other possible weather conditions. I will use the following notation: X""a to mean that X is a relevant contrast to the denotation of the expression a. For e.xample, X:,,John means that X is a relevant contrast to the denotation of John, presumably someone named John.
Ont,, +ff= Onl.1· ff
The semantics I will assume for only is this: it asserts that the focussed item i, the only one from the set of relevant contrasts that can be truthfully combined with the rest of the sentence. There is in addition an implicature that the sentence without only is tme.7 For a sentence like ( 12a) this will gi1e us roughly the semantics in (12b).
( 12) a. John only SWIMS, b. VX~wim: X(jl ___,. X:::swim lmplicature: John swims.
That is. ( 12a) will be true iff the only property eomparahle to swimming that truthfully applies to John is swimming itself: if John does anything it all. it is only swimming. In addition, it is implicated that John does in fact swim. What happens when we combine this with our semantics for conditional~'> What is the n1caning we get for ( JJ )'! (13) Only if you help me will I do the dishes.
Let us assume for now that what is focussed in ( 13) is the complement of if, that is the clause you help me. Whal we get is ( 14).K 6 1n th1~ I agtce \\ Llh lhc '-1.C'!lllmC'nls c,prcs•;cd b~ L::,l.·an ( 1991) An ,·:1rl: atlcmpt al anal:-11ng ,mfr ¥. int,, 011/r and i/can be h,unJ in i\kCawlcy ( I 97,l) This " the standard treatment as argued for by H, ,rn 1. 1969). *rhc inner 4uantificr in (OJ J represent; the unil crsJI 4uant1fka11on m c1 si1u,it1ons triggcrcJ by the modal will. Note that the semantics proposed here seems to predi..:t that 011/v ifcond1tJ<,n<1i' will he uncomfortable with left-monotone increasing adverbial quant1f1cr,. The reason is that 1he~ "·ill make it almost imposstble for there ln be a uniquely adequate rcstnctor set I "di lea1c Jcta, lcJ d,s.:ussion ,,I this fur a future occasion. <14i VX,._vou help me: t>tcr·x,1 do tht~ disht'sJ-.X -you help me lmplicature: If you help me. I will ,h, the di she~.
What ( 14) says i, that the only cir,·t1mstance in" hirh I will do the dishes is one in which you help me.
h·,·11 r // h·rn I/
The semantics l \\ ill ass time for e,·,.·n is this: it implicates that there is a proper!) lrum the set uf rele1a11t cuntra',(s tu the focussed item that 11a, mure like!) tu bt' ahle to be truthfully combined with the rest of the sentence than the focussed item itself.<> Fnr a Sl'.ntence like ( J5al this "ill g1\\' us the ,ema11tics ill I J:'ihl.
( 15\ a. John even SWI\!S. b. .luhn ,wims. lmplicature: 3X~"im: rnim(j) <p X(j\ Ttwt is, ( J5a1 will be true ill John swims. !'here is an additional irnplicatun: that there is a property comparnbie to swimming that wa, more like\:, true of John than '" imming itself.
What happens when we combine thi, with our semantics for conditionals'' What is the meaning we get for ( 16'!' 1 If) ou help me l won· t do the dishes.
ln1plic1lure: 3X~~ou help me : no(C('you hdp mt·.l do the dishes) < p no{ Cr X.I do tht' dishes)
The implicature of ( 17) is that there are circumst::rnces other than your helping me in which it is even more likel) that I wu11·1 dn the dishes.
Complex Conditionals and Oonktiy-Anaphora
We now embark ,in our investigation of the interaction of complex conditionals and dnnh·y-anaphor,1. Th<' first ,1bser1 at1on is that in grneral the possihilil) of donkey-anaphora seems severely limited with complex condirionab. The crucial data arc given in ( 18) and ( 19).
'+-rhc prnpcr ,cmar1ltcs for t'\'i:'n J', in much more d1\plltc lh:u, the (1Jlc tor 011h Snmc nf the rdcLrnL rclcrc-ncl'~ arc: The challenge for the general theory of donkey-anaphora and for the semantics of conditional clauses then is to explain (i) the general unavailability of donkey-anaphora in complex conditionals and (ii) the possibility of donkeyanaphora in special circumstances. In this section, I will lay out why donkeyanaphora is generally impossible with complex conditionals. In the Section 4. I will tum to the cases in (20).
Unless
Why do unless-clauses not allow donkey anaphora? It is important to realize at this point that within the framework assumed here the availability of donkeyanaphora is not a question of syntactic or semantic scope. Instead, the operative question is: Is there an appropriate entity in the antecedent .~iruation to refer hack ro with a disguised definite description? Consider now the contrast in (21 ).
(21) a. lf anyone objects, I will talk to him.
b. *Unless anyone objects, I will talk to him.
Take (2la). The donkey pronoun him in the main clause is interpreted as an Etype pronoun, as a disguised definite description, something like the man who ohjects or the ohjector. This interpretation meshes successfully with the meaning of the rest of the sentence, which as a whole can be paraphrased as "All of the minimal situations in which someone objects are part of a larger situation in which I will talk to the objector ... The analysis for (2 I b) with the unle.n-conditional will be something like (22).
(22) a. V(C-{sl 3x (x objects ins)}) (I talk to the objector) b. ..All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations except the ones in which someone objects are part of a larger situation in which I talk to the objector". This is patently nonsensical. In a situation where no one objects there is no objector to talk to. More precisely. the E-type pronoun carries an existence presupposition: simply that in each of the cases considered there exists an objector. The unless-clause on the other hand removes exactly those situations where there is an objector from the domain of quantification. The presupposition of the E-type pronoun therefore cannot be fulfilled. ( 21 b) then is deviant because of a presupposition failure.
'Only if
What is wrong with (21)?
*Only if someone objects will I talk to him.
(24) a. \fX=meone objects: '11.ClXJ talk to the objector) ---...X=someone objects b. ..The only type of situation comparable to ones where someone objects which is such that in all of those situations I talk to the objector are those in which someone objects".
Of course. (24b) is kind of hard to parse. But a moment of reflection will reveal that our sentence (23) There is no point in expressing a proposition unless it distinguishes among the possible worlds which are considered live options in the context. .. (Stalnaker 1972: 388) This \,ould mean that there is no point in uttering (23 J. But is that enough to make it ungrammatical? After all, we all are guilt)' of making useless utterances every now and then without therefore being classified as incompetent speakers of English. The argument in the case of (23) would have to be that it is structurally pointless. in some sense of 'structurally'. The issue is a vexing one and recurs frequently in semantic accounts of ungramrnaticality. lO In the absence of a better account for the illformedness of (2,) I will rest my case for now.
Even If
What's wrong with (25)? According to our semantics. (25) will have the implieature in (2o).
*Even if anyone objects I will talk to him.
(26) 3,~meone objects: all(Cnsomeone objects.I talk to the objector) <p all(CnXJ talk to the objector)
This implicature is nonsensical. The set of relevant contrasts to anyone· s objecting will presumably be made up of alternative situations in which no one objects. None of those can be more likely to be such that I will talk to the Ofll' who objects than the ones in which someone actually does object. Again, the E-type pronoun already presupposes that all the situations considered contain an objector. hence a set of contrasting situations where no one objects will be useless. And again. we have to resort to vigorous hand-waving to get from this built-in pragmatic-anomaly to the ungrammaticality of (26).
Focus-lnduct>d Constraint,; on Domains
We will now have to deal with the data in (20) . which show that if material in the conditional other than the indefinite is focussed the indefirnte can serve as the antecedent for a donkey pronoun in the matrix. How come? (27) Unless you {i;N /a donkey. you shouldn"t beat it.
Why should stress on the verb make it possible that the object is available as an antecedent for a donkey pronoun? After all. unle.1s will still remove all the situations where you own a donkey. Where is the donkey that it refers back to?
The intuition I will develop is that the focus on the verb signals that we are contemplating alternative relations between you and a donkey, and we are saying that none of those except the ones that are owning relations entitle you to beating it. The donkey will exist in all the situations considered. Hence the donkey pronoun is licit.
Assume that. following Rooth ( I 985 etc.) . in the interpretation of you OIVN a Jonker, we compute not only the ordinary denotation Uyou own a donkey U 0 • but also the set of relevant contrasts to the ordinary denotation. call it OWill OIi'!\' a donkey UP. In terms of our earlier notation this "ill tum out to be the set {X: x~ ,.
UWill own ll Jonker n°}.
What use is this set? Well. it seems to be the set of alternatives being talked about. A natural move now would be to say that the first argument C of the adverbial quantifier modified by the un/n.1-conditional is identified with or restricted to this set of alternatives. The proposal is seen in (28). very careful about what to admit into the set of relevant contrasts to the owningrelation. If we consider all possible binary relation between a person and a donkey there will be lots and lots of those and in particular many that do not entail the existence of the donkey. For example. this is a binary relation between me and a donkey: "living in the same century as an artist who painted a picture of". This problem is discussed in by Rooth ( 1991 ) . For our stock example. that means that the domain of quantification will have to be all those situations that contain you standing in an owning-type relation (borrowing/leasing/renting/etc.) to a donkey.
From now on. I will assume that ORD P is the set of relevant contrasts. however that is computed.
Only Ifand Even If
The explanation of the contrasts in (29) runs along the same lines.
a. Only if you {7;~} a donkey, should you beat it. b. Even if you {lo~} a donkey, you shouldn't beat it.
The evoked set of alternative situations to your owning a donkey will be comprised solely of situations where there is in fact a donkey that 1s owned/borrowed/leased. Hence, the E-type pronoun it will succesfully refer.
A Mystery: Narrow CN-Focus
Consider the contrast in (30), which should be read under narrow focus on the common noun donkey as indicated by the context sentence. e. Even if it's a D0Nkey that a farmer owns he doesn"t beat it. f. '·'Unless it's a DONkey that a farmer owns he doesn't beat it.
Under the intended interpretation the focus on the common noun should evoke a contrast set of pack animals. The E-type pronoun should be able to refer to the pack animal that a farmer owns. It seems that this is indeed available with the only if-and even if-conditionals. But something still obstructs the successful pack animal-anaphora with unless-clauses. This is a mystery to me.
Focus and If-Conditionals: The Proportion Problem
Does the semantics of if have to be focus-conscious. too? There are suggestions in the literature that say yes. The question arises in the context of the so-called 'proportion problem', which is a serious problem for the unselective binding approach to donkey anaphora. The crucial observation is that there is a prominent reading of (31) that does not quantify over farmer-donkey pairs but over donkeyowning farmers. The empirical test consists in judging whether a very rich farmer owning hundreds of donkeys would tip the balance. The consensus is that there is a reading where it doesn't matter how many donkeys a farmer owns: we are just quantifying over donkey-owners.
(31) If a farmer owns a donkey, he is happy.
The problem is of course that any unselective approach would have the higher operator bind both indefinites in the restrictive if-clause. thus predicting that 01) is counting farmer-donkey pairs. A way of selecting the correct quantifiees is needed.
There are quite a variety of ideas on the market on how to deal with this selection problem. KratLer ( 1989a) and Diesing ( !990) suggest that only indefinites that can be scrambled outside the VI' can be captured. 11 Chierchia ( 199 I) appeals to a process of topic-selection. so far unreduced to other mechanisms. All of these bear a close relation to focus phenomena. Let me sketch how a focus sensitive semantic rule for conditionals would fare with the proportion problem. I' Within a situation based approach, the task boils down to finding a principled way of deriving the set of situations specified in (32) . from Heim ( I ()(X)J_ as the domain of quantification. The minimal situations in the set of situations in U2) will contain a farmer and not much else. All of them will be extendablc into siwations containing donkeys that the former own,;. Any nf the farmers quantified o\er will therefore he donkey-owners. But the number of donkeys OWJH'd play, no role for the e\aluation of the quantified stalement. The desired farmer donkey asymmetry is achieved. Heim ( I99<)i derives U2J via syntactic manipulations at LF. Can we gel the same result by using the focus story'! Let's assume. maybe not too recklessly. thal there is focus 011 the verb phrase in the asymmetric reading of (3 I). U The input to the semantics therefore ,\ ill be (33 ).
(.B) lfa farmu !owns a donkey IF, he is happy.
Try this on for size. The presupposition value for the complement of i/'will be all the situations containing , 1 farmer where the farmer has some property in the L'Oll trast class uf donk,~y ()\\ 11i ng. Now. I\ e cou Id Sil) that t Iii s set is pared d(m 11 forthcr by 111aki11g sure tl1a1 all these situations me part of a situation where lhe farmer owns c1 donkey. This will weed oul all the tl\lll donkey ,n1ning farmers.
Hut the domain or quantifi,·ation me still _just situatiuns 1\ith a farmer and some property. This will mean that the adverb will in fact quantify o\'cr farmers. The proposal in (3~1) is what we seem to need. Sentence (JI) under the asymmetric reading will bt· intcrprd!'d as in C~S). 13 Thi~ a:-.
•;urnpl1nn rH:r~h 11, hr 1n,est1ga1eJ 1n Jt·ta11 h~ !1~1~111t2 ,ll dtlltrent 'l'rb ,:la""-<'"-JIH.1 d111crcnt rncu.., cl\\l~nmcn[,
Focus-induced constraint: C ~[ R] P (35) "All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations in which there is a farmer with some property of the donkey-owning type and which are part of a situation in which there is a farmer who owns a donkey are part of a larger situation in which the farmer is happy."
We have a problem. The unfocussed existential quantifier a farmer from the ifclause will be interpreted twice, once in ff R) P and once in ff RD 0 , Note the double occurrence of "there is a farmer. .. " in the paraphrase in (35). There is no guarantee that we are talking about the same farmer. In effect, any farmer will be in the domain of quantification as long as there is one donkey-owning farmer in the world. How can we make sure that only donkey-owning farmers are considered? Heim had no problems with this, since in her LF-approach there was no second occurrence of the existential quantifier. Instead, there was a trace interpreted as a bound variable. The more purely semantic account that we are pursuing here has no such option. What we need is a relation between the farmer-situations quantified over and the farmer-donkey-owning situations that is stronger than the mere part-of relation. Within the machinery of situation semantics there is in fact such a stronger relation. Not only can we say that a proposition is true in a situation (sEp), but we can also construct a notion of a situation being a fact that makes a proposition true, which is somewhat stronger. Building on that notion we can then use a more selective part-of relation which does the right thing for our problem. Angelika Kratzer ( I 990, I 991) gives the definition in (36).
(36) Facts that make proposition:, true
Ifs is any situation and p any proposition, then s is a fact that makes p true iff for alls' such thats' s sands' r!. p, there is ans" such thats' s s" s s, and s" is a minimal situation in which pis true.
Essentially, this definition ensures that a fact that makes a proposition true does not contain any situation that doesn't contribute to the truth of the situation, it doesn't contain any irrelevant stuff. That is what we needed. The non-donkeyowning farmers do not contribute to the truth of ''there is a farmer who owns a donkey". So they can be filtered out. The amended semantics for if is given in (37) and sentence (3 I) gets the paraphrase in (38). 
The Relation Between Focus and Scoping
After having developed a fairly successful theory of how complex conditionals and donkey-anaphora interact, it is time to see what these facts tell us about the roots of semantic partition.
Focus and rr>-Jnternal Scrambling
The crucial innovation of my account is that focus-induced contrast sets are used to restrict the domain of quantification in such a way that donkey-anaphora is made possible_ Can this effect of making indefinites in complex conditionals available for donkey anaphora be achieved in a more syntactic way? Cicnnaro Chierchia ( 1991) proposes that only indefinites that arc topics are captured by adverbial quantifiers. That seems to be on the right track, see also Harbara Partee·s ( 1991) work on the connection between topic-focus articulation and quantification. We can see my proposal as an implementation of this general idea. But there could of course be more syntactic reflexes of topic-hood that may play a more primary role. Chierchia himself just takes topic-marking as a primitive in his system, deferring discussion. Let's do some of the required work.
Molly Diesing ( 1990) and Angelika Kratzer ( 1989a) have devised a system which postulates an asymmetry between material inside the verb phrase and material higher than the verb phrase_ Since they close off the VP by an operation of existential closure, only indefinites that find themselves outside the VP at the crucial level (LF) remain unscathed and can be captured by a higher quantifier. Maybe we can mentally associate the VP-material with the notion of focus and the higher material with topic-hood.
Let us look at an example.
Unless you {lo~} a donkey, you shouldn't beat it.
Assuming for the time being that we can establish a connection between focus on the verb and LF-scrambling of the object, the LFs for the sentences in (40) The unscrambled indefinite object in (41a) gets bound off by the VP Existential Closure and cannot be captured by the quantifier Jhould. In (41b), the object has scrambled and can get bound by the quantifier and the donkey pronoun is licensed too. Superficially, this may look right, but look closer. The indefinite is still inside the unless-clause. And unless has a distinctly negative meaning. However we want to express the meaning of unless in this framework (it would have to subtract tuples of variable length I guess), it seems that as long as the indefinites are buried inside the unless-clause they won't be able to restrict the quantifier. I think that the correct LF for the well-formed sentence in (40) should be as in (42). (43) *Who will you call Kim if/when/unless/although/because you see t?
It seems then that the cases of defocussed indefinites in complex conditionals presented here offer a strong argument that focus-induced restrictions of adverbial quantifiers cannot be reduced to syntactic processes.
Deep Embeddings
Angelika Kratzer pointed out to me a type of example that can be used to show that the focus-story I have told does need to be supplemented with a scoping mechanism of some sort. Consider the data in (44). (44) a. Unless you are absolutely sure that you OWN a donkey, you shouldn't beat it. b. Unless you know the person who OWNS a donkey. you shouldn't beat it. c. Unless you are wondering whether you might BUY a donkey, you shouldn"t look it in the mouth.
Here. the set of relevant alternatives clearly won't be such that all of them guarantee the existence of a donkey. For example, the set of situations where you are absolutely sure that you own a donkey or are borrowing a donkey or are leasing a donkey does not invariably entail the existence of such a donkey. You may be mistaken. It seems to me that to be grammatical the sentences in (AK) have to be read with a de re-interpretation of the donkey. The most popular account for de rereadings is of course based on scoping. What we have to do then is to scope the indefinite u donkey to right under unless. This should be possible since the islands here are of the weak sort. Compare the essentially grammatical examples of extraction out of these contexts in (45). (45) a. 'This is a donkey that I'm absolutely sure that I own. b. 'This is a donkey that I know the person who owns. c. 'This is a donkey that I'm wondering whether I might buy. Now. quite possibly the scoping is not available on the first parse of the sentences in (44). We could perhaps say that it is the existence presupposition of the E-type pronoun that triggers the scoping.
It seems then that the data in (44) offer a strong argument that the effect of syntactic scoping on the domain selection of adverbial quantifiers cannot be entirely reduced to focus phenomena. Taken together, the results presented here argue for a peaceful co-existence of the focus effects and the syntactic mechanisms. Neither can be entirely reduced to the other.
Left open is the plausible conception that in the unmarked case the two phenomena are highly correlated. Defocussing an item is then correlated with it taking a syntactic position outside of the typical focus domain. the VP. This whole area is under active investigation and promises fruitful results for the syntax and semantics of quantification.
